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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DEE BLAIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

District Court No. 970400626PI

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Court of Appeals No. 990235-CA

Defendant and Appellee.

Priority No. 15

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

ISSUES ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that Utah law

requires Appellant to attach supportive evidence to her Memorandum in
Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.

B.

Whether the trial court correctly determined that Appellant

failed to produce sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of
negligence against Appellee.
C.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that

Appellant's failure to attach supporting evidence to her Motion in
Opposition to Summary Judgment is not the type of mistake or inadvertence
that merits relief under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a Motion for Summary Judgment, an appellate court
accords no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions but examines them
for correctness. Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Schurtz
v. BMW of North Am.. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
In considering a Motion for Relief based on Rule 60(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the trial
court has wide discretion in determining whether a party has demonstrated
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Larsen v. Collins.

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnet_appellee wpd

684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). The trial court's ruling denying a rule 60(b)
motion will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.
Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b) is
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "A."
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(c) is
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "B."
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e) is
attached in the Addendum as Exhibit "B."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arose from an injury allegedly sustained as the result of a
slip and fall of Plaintiff and Appellant, Dee Blain ("Blain"), in a retail store
operated by Defendant and Appellee, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart")

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appe!lee wpd
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on September 25, 1995. (Complaint at 1; R. 4). The subject grocery store
is located in Utah County, State of Utah (Id.)II.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE
TRIAL COURT
On or about August 8, 1997, Blain filed her Complaint in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Civil No. 970400626 PI. (Complaint at 4; R. 4).
On or about September 5, 1997, Wal-Mart filed its Answer to Blain's
Complaint. (Answer at 4; R. 15). On or about December 10, 1998, WalMart filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment. (Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2; R. 66; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment at 12; R. 103). On or about January 11, 1999, Blain
filed her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and on
about February 9, 1999, Wal-Mart filed its Reply Memorandum. (Plaintiff's
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, R. 113;
Defendant's Reply Memorandum at 16, R. 167). The trial court granted
Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 9, 1999.
4
C \WP51 \WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnet_appellee wpd
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(Memorandum Decision Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "C"; R. 177).
On or about March 9, 1999, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b), Blain
filed a Motion for Relief from Order and a Memorandum in Support of
Motion. (Motion for Relief from Order at 1; R. 179; Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Order at 8; R. 187). Wal-Mart
filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion for
Relief from Order on March 17, 1999. (Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Order at 13; R. 210). On
March 24, 1999, the trial court issued its ruling denying Blain's motion.
(Ruling at 1; R. 211). The next day, the trial court received Blain's timely
Reply Memorandum to Wal-Mart's Memorandum in Opposition to Blain's
60(b) motion. (Reply Memorandum at 5; R. 245). After considering
Blain's Reply Memorandum, the trial court found no reason to change its
March 4 ruling and again denied Blain's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief.
(Ruling at 1; R. 248).

C \WP51\WAL-MAR1ABLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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On March 5, 1999, Blain filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court, appealing the Order granting Wal-Mart's summary
judgment. (Notice of Appeal at 1; R. 189). On or about May 26, 1999,
Blain filed a second Notice of Appeal, this time appealing the trial court's
denial of Blain's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief. (Notice of Appeal at 2; R.
260).
On or about July 6, 1999, Blain filed a Motion for Summary
Disposition with the Utah Supreme Court asking that the Utah Supreme
Court reverse the District Court decision on the basis that the trial court
committed manifest error in making the decision. (Motion for Summary
Disposition; Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Her Motion for Summary Reversal). Wal-Mart subsequently filed a
Memorandum in Opposition and Blain filed a Reply Memorandum.
(Appellee Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Opposition to Appellant's
Motion for Summary Disposition; Appellant Dee Blain's Reply
Memorandum to Appellee Wal-Mart Stores' Responsive Memorandum to
Appellant's Motion for Summary Disposition).

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd

This Court subsequently issued an Order denying and deferring
Blain's motion for summary disposition. (Order dated August 26, 1999).
Finally, this Court issued an Order consolidating Case No. 990235-CA and
Case No. 990558-CA into the current Case No. 990235-CA. (Order of
Consolidation at 1; R. 272).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This case arose as the result of a slip and fall that

allegedly occurred on September 25, 1995, in the Wal-Mart store in Orem,
Utah. (Complaint at 1; R. 4).
2.

At the time of the occurrence, Blain was accompanied by

her daughter, Sheri Anderson. (Id). Blain and her daughter had completed
their shopping and were walking toward the cashier stands to pay for their
purchases. (Deposition of Dee Blain at 11; R. 88). As the two shopping
companions were walking, Blain alleges that she slipped in detergent that
had been spilled on the floor of the Wal-Mart store. (Id. at 22; R. 82).
3.

Blain's daughter testified that they did not know how long

the substance had been on the floor, or where it came from, or whether any

C \WP51\WAL-MARTABLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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Wal-Mart employee was aware of the spill prior to Blain's fall.
(Deposition of Sheri L. Anderson at 31; R. 79).
4.

Blain testified that she was stunned by the fall and that she

remained on the floor after the fall for about 10 to 15 minutes. (Deposition
of Dee Blain at 15 - 17; R. 83 - 85).
5.

Melia Lei O'Hawaii White Freeman was employed at

Wal-Mart as a department manager in the fabrics section on the day of
Blain's fall. (Deposition of Melia Freeman at 8; R. 75).
6.

On the day of Blain's fall, Ms. Freeman was working in

one of the aisles when she noticed a couple of small wet spots on the floor.
(Id. at 33; R. 74). She then retrieved some paper towels and began wiping
up what she saw. (Id.).
7.

As Ms. Freeman wiped the spots from the floor, she

noticed another spot. (Id. at 33 - 34 and 36 - 37; R. 73 - 74 and 70 - 71).
As she wiped the second spot, she noticed a third. (Id.). This became a
pattern as she cleaned up the spill. (Id.).

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appea! documeiits\bnef_appellee wpd
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8.

Ms. Freeman followed the spots around a corner and came

upon Blain. (Id. at 35 - 38; R. 69 - 72). When Ms. Freeman arrived where
Blain was located, Blain was standing and speaking with Troy Guevara, the
assistant store manager. (Id.).
9.

It only took one or two minutes after Ms. Freeman

discovered the spill to clean it all the way to where she found Blain and Mr.
Guevara. (Id. at 51 - 52; R. 67 - 68).
10.

On December 12, 1998, Wal-Mart filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment and accompanying Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Motion for
Summary Judgment, R. 66; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 103).
11.

On January 8, 1999, Blain filed a Memorandum in

Opposition to Wal-Mart's Motion. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; R. 113). Among the many
other arguments Blain made in her Memorandum, she argued that, although
Melia Freeman had seen a customer talking to the store manager after she

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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walked to the front of the store, the person Ms. Freeman saw was not Blain.
(Id. at 7; R. 107).
12.

Blain offered no affidavits, interrogatories or deposition

testimony supportive of her arguments. (Id.)13.

On February 9, 1999, the Court filed a Memorandum

Decision and Order granting Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment
because Blain failed to prove that Wal-Mart had actual or constructive
knowledge of the spill prior to Blain's fall, or that Wal-Mart had adequate
opportunity to clean the spill after Blain's fall. (Memorandum Decision and
Order at 2 - 3, Exhibit "C"; R. 175 - 76).
14.

Because of Blain's failure to provide any evidence

supportive of her assertions, the Court was unable to consider her
arguments that Freeman was not talking to Blain when she walked to the
front of the store. (Id.).
15.

On February 25, 1999, Blain filed with the District Court

a Motion for Relief from the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order
under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Motion for Relief

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnei_appellee wpd
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from Order; R. 179). Wal-Mart filed a Memorandum in Opposition and
Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. (Defendant Wal-Mart Stores'
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
Order, R. 210; Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Rule 60 Motion; R. 245).
16.

On March 22, 1999, the Court issued a Ruling denying

Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order. (Ruling at 1; R. 211). The Court
found in the Ruling "that Plaintiff's failure to provide any supporting
affidavit, deposition, or other evidence in opposition to Defendant's
supported Motion for Summary Judgment does not constitute grounds for
Rule 60(b) relief." (Id.).
17.

Blain subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal relating to the

District Court's denial of Blain's Rule 60 Motion for Relief and the Court's
decision granting Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Notice of
Appeal, R. 189; Notice of Appeal, R. 260).

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and judicial

opinions interpreting the rule provide that a party has an affirmative duty to
accompany a memorandum in support or opposition to a motion for
summary judgment with evidentiary material. Public policy also favors
attachment of evidence to preclude a party from relying on misstatements of
testimony or even fabricated testimony. In contravention of these legal
principles, Blain failed to attach any evidence to support her arguments in
opposition to Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore,
Blain's arguments are based on mere conjecture and speculation. Thus, the
trial court was correct in dismissing Blain's Complaint.
II.

Blain erroneously argues that any misidentification by Melia

Freeman of Blain creates an issue of fact on whether Wal-Mart had notice
of the condition causing Plaintiff's fall. The record shows that this
argument is nothing more than conjecture and would not have made a
difference in the Court's Ruling even if the applicable deposition pages

C \WP5l\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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would have been attached to Blain's Memorandum in Opposition to WalMart's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The clear evidence in the record demonstrates that Wal-Mart manager
Troy Guevara discovered Blain after she fell, that Wal-Mart employee Ms.
Freeman cleaned up the spill as soon as she noticed it, and that directly after
cleaning the spill, Ms. Freeman came upon Blain and Mr. Guevera. The
trial court accurately gleaned from the depositions on record that Wal-Mart
did not have knowledge of the spill until after Blain's fall and had no
opportunity to clean the spill. As a result, the lower court correctly
concluded that the evidence failed to show that Wal-Mart had notice of the
condition or a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition.
III. The trial court properly granted Wal-Mart's Motion for
Summary Judgment under the legal standards that apply to slip and fall
cases. The Utah appellate courts have not wavered from holding that to
make out a prima facie case of negligence against a business owner for an
injury caused by a temporary condition, a plaintiff must produce sufficient
evidence showing that defendant had 1) actual or constructive notice of the

C \WP5l\WAL-MAR"nBLAIN\appeal.docuinents\bnef_appellee.wpd
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condition, and 2) a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition after
having notice.
In the instant case, the record is devoid of any evidence that Wal-Mart
had actual or constructive notice of the spilled detergent before Blain fell.
The record shows that Wal-Mart only noticed the spill after Blain's fall and
immediately wiped it up. Blain's arguments to the contrary are nothing
more than bare allegations unsupported by evidence in the record Thus,
Blain failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence against Wal-Mart,
and the trial court properly dismissed her Complaint.
IV. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides relief
from judgment under certain circumstances, including "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Blain argued that her failure
to attach evidence supporting the arguments in her Memorandum opposing
summary judgment constituted mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.
However, rather than offering a valid excuse for her omission, Blain
argued repeatedly in her Relief Memorandum that she thought the rule did

C \WP5I\WAL-MAimBLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd

14

not require her to attach deposition testimony. In direct contrast to Blain's
argument, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires such
attachment. Misunderstanding or misreading the law is not "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" warranting reconsideration.
The trial judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Blain's Motion for
Relief and the lower court should not be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
UTAH LAW PLACES AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY ON A
RESPONDING PARTY TO ATTACH SUPPORTIVE
EVIDENCE TO ITS MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Blain argues in her Brief that the law in Utah does not require her to
attach or file supportive deposition testimony, affidavits, interrogatories or
other evidence to her memorandum opposing a motion for summary
judgment and that mere citations to page numbers in depositions are
sufficient. Brief of Plaintiff/ Appellant at 15 - 20. Contrary to Plaintiffs
arguments, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and case law

C \WP5l\WAL-MAR"nBLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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interpreting the rule provide that deposition testimony must be filed with the
memoranda.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. The motion,
memoranda and affidavits shall be filed and served in
accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
* *

*

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavits or otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If
he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him.

C \WP51\WAL-MARTABLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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UTAH

R. CIV. P. 56(c) and (e) (emphasis added). Rule 4-501(l)(B) of the

Utah Code of Judicial Administration further provides that a party opposing
a motion shall file a memorandum in opposition along with all supporting
documentation. Utah Code of Judicial Administration R. 4-501(l)(B).
The Utah Supreme Court has reiterated and clarified these provisions,
holding repeatedly that a party opposing a summary judgment motion has an
affirmative duty to provide evidentiary support for the assertions they make.
In a 1994 Utah Supreme Court case, Thayne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994), the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed an opposing memorandum but failed to attach any affidavits
or evidentiary support for his memorandum. Id. at 123. The court granted
defendant's motion in large part because "Thayne, as the party opposing
Beneficial's properly supported motion, had an affirmative duty to respond
with affidavits or other materials allowed by rule 56(e)." Id. at 124
(citations omitted).
The case of Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development
Company. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983), was cited by the District Court in its

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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Memorandum Decision. The Utah Supreme Court in Franklin likewise held
that the party opposing a summary judgment motion has a duty to attach
supportive evidence. The Utah Supreme Court stated as follows in the
Franklin opinion:
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for
summary judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court
may properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact
unless the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses
the existence of such an issue. Without such a showing, the
Court need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable
law, the moving party is entitled to judgment.
Franklin. 659 P.2d at 1044; See also Cowen and Co. v. Atlas Stock
Transfer Co.. 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984); Busch Corp. v. State Farm
Fire&Cas. Co.. 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 - 20 (Utah 1987).
Public policy also favors Wal-Mart's position on this issue. Should
Blain's argument be accepted, an unscrupulous party could file a motion for
summary judgment, or memorandum in opposition to such a motion, based
entirely on misstatements of testimony or even fabricated testimony. A
court simply could not distinguish between legitimate arguments and
unsubstantiated contentions. To accept Blain's position would completely
C \WP51\WAL-MARTABLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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defeat the purpose behind Rule 56 which requires a party to offer
evidentiary support for its allegations in a memorandum.
Blain argues in the alternative that if she was required to attach
supportive depositions, the trial court decision was in error because WalMart attached the relevant sections of the deposition transcripts to its
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellant at 25-33. Plaintiff therefore argues that the Court had
the evidence to consider. Id.
Contrary to Blain's representations, Wal-Mart did not attach all of the
portions of Blain's and Freeman's deposition transcripts that support Blain's
misidentification argument. For example, in making the misidentification
argument, Blain cited to pages 39, 41, 44 - 45 and 56 - 57 of Freeman's
deposition transcript. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Statement of
Facts 1f1f 14 - 16; R. 109 - 10. She further cited to page 19 of her own
deposition transcript. Id- 1 11; R. 110. In its Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, Wal-Mart did not attach pages 39, or 56 57 of Freeman's transcript or page 19 of Plaintiff's deposition transcript.

C \WP5l\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, Exhibits "A" and "C"; R. 67 - 76 and 82 - 90;
Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits
"B" and "D"; R. 117-30 and 137 - 40. Not only did Wal-Mart not attach
the evidence to support Blain on this issue, Blain also did not attach the
evidence. As a result, the court correctly ruled that it had no supporting
factual basis to consider Blain's arguments. Memorandum Decision at 2 3, Exhibit "C";R. 175-76.
Blain simply cannot expect the Court to evaluate her arguments
without support in the record for review. The deposition transcripts are not
on file. If the party opposing a motion does not attach or otherwise file the
evidence, the Court does not have an opportunity to review the evidence,
and it is unfair to expect the Court to take Blain's "word for it."
Both the governing law and public policy support the trial Court's
decision to hold Blain to the attachment rule. Blain's arguments to the
contrary should be declined and the trial court's ruling affirmed.

C \WP51\WAL-MART\BLAIN\appeal documents\bnef_appellee wpd
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II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED WALMART'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE IS
NO EVIDENCE THAT WAL-MART HAD NOTICE OF
THE SPILL BEFORE THE OCCURRENCE.
Blain indicates in her Brief that the District Court acted "in haste" and
did not consider Blain's factual arguments in granting Wal-Mart's Motion
for Summary Judgment in Wal-Mart's favor. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at
35-36. To the contrary, a conscientious reading of the District Court's
Memorandum Decision demonstrates that the Court carefully considered
every supported claim. Memorandum Decision at 1 - 3, Exhibit "C"; R.
175-77. The only argument the Court specifically said it could not
evaluate was the argument that Melia Freeman misidentified the customer at
the end of the spill as Blain. Id. at 2, Exhibit "C"; R. 176.
The Memorandum Decision shows that the judge considered the
factual arguments supported by the attached materials and concluded that
"there is no evidence that Defendant had knowledge of the liquid detergent
spill until after Plaintiffs injury", and that there was "also no evidence that
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the spill had existed for a long enough time that Defendant had constructive
knowledge of it." Id.
In this appeal, Blain makes much of the argument that Ms. Freeman,
the Wal-Mart employee who discovered and immediately cleaned up the
spill, misidentified the customer at the end of the spill as Dee Blain.
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition at 7; R. 107. Blain speculates that
because the description given by Freeman does not match her own, Blain's
fall could have occurred after the described meeting took place.

Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Opposition at 7; R. 107. As mentioned above, this is only
one of several arguments Blain raised in her Memorandum in Opposition to
Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. at 5 - 9; R. 105 - 09. The
record of the case shows that the argument is nothing but conjecture and
would not have made a difference in the Court's ruling even if the
deposition pages were attached to the Memorandum.
Contrary to Blain's arguments, the evidence of the case does not
support Plaintiffs position that Blain's fall could have occurred after the
meeting. The clear and substantiated evidence in the record shows that (a)
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Troy Guevara discovered Ms. Blain after she fell, (b) that a female
employee from the fabrics department arrived at the scene after Plaintiffs
fall and told Guevara that she had cleaned up the spill and that the spill
started back in fabrics, (c) that Melia Freeman was that employee, (d) that
when Ms. Freeman arrived at the scene, no one, including Blain, was lying
on the floor, and (e) when Freeman left the scene, the spill had been
completely cleaned up. Defendant Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 - 4, R. 100 - 102; Defendant
Wal-Mart Stores' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Summary Judgment at 2 - 5 and 11 - 14, R. 163-166 and
154 - 157; Deposition of Melia Freeman at 8, 24, 33 - 40, 43 - 45, 51 - 52
and 59 - 60; R. 69 - 75, 118 - 124 and 129; Deposition of Dee Blain at 6,
11 - 17 and 22; R. 82 - 89; Deposition of Troy Guevara at 48 - 49, 54-55;
R. 144 - 147.
The identity of any other woman speaking with Troy Guevara at that
time is irrelevant. The relevant issue is that by the sworn testimony of Troy
Guevara and Melia Freeman, the meeting/conversation between Guevara
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and Freeman occurred after Blain's fall. Id. Blain offered no evidentiary
support that the meeting/conversation between Guevera and Freeman took
place before she fell. In fact, all sworn testimony in the case is to the
contrary.
Blain's argument that Wal-Mart may have knowledge of the spill
before the fall because Freeman's description of Blain was inaccurate is
based entirely on speculation. Blain is requesting the jury to draw an
unreasonable inference that is not supported by the record. In deciding
whether a plaintiffs complaint can survive a motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiff is entitled to all "reasonable" or "fair" inferences which tend to
prove his or her case. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 P.2d 175
(Utah 1975); Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co.. 876 P.2d 415 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994). A plaintiff is not entitled to inferences based on conjecture that
are not supported by evidence in the record. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d
1170 (Utah 1983). A jury is not permitted to speculate that the defendant is
negligent. Id.; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955);
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
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In her Appeal Brief, Blain sets forth a list of other inferences the jury
could supposedly make to find that Wal-Mart had knowledge of the
substance on the floor before Blain's fall. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 30
- 33. These supposed inferences are not "reasonable" or "fair" inferences
but bare allegations unsubstantiated by evidence in the record. An example
is Blain's argument that a jury could infer that Freeman avoided aspects of
her job, such as looking for safety hazards, because she admitted to
sometimes removing her smock to avoid interacting with customers. Id. at
31 - 32. This argument is an unreasonable and unfounded stretch of the
evidence. Furthermore, Blain takes the testimony out of context. A review
of the transcript shows that Freeman testified she sometimes takes off her
smock so that she can quickly and efficiently, without customer distraction,
clean the floor in the event of a spill. Deposition of Melia Freeman at 60;
R. 118. This testimony is supportive of Wal-Mart's position, and it in no
way advances Blain's case.
There is absolutely no evidence that Melia Freeman avoided looking
for safety hazards, or avoided promptly cleaning up the spill that caused
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Plaintiffs fall, merely because she may have removed her Wal-Mart smock.
To the contrary, the evidence shows that Freeman was diligent in cleaning
the spilled substance on the day of the occurrence, and, that if she happened
to remove her smock, it was so that she could focus on cleaning the spill.
Deposition of Melia Freeman at 33 - 38 and 60; R. 69 - 74 and 118.
It is also important to note that Blain raises the "smock argument" for
the first time on appeal. The argument was not raised in the trial court and
therefore cannot be considered on appeal. Certified Sur. Group. Ltd. v. UT
Inc.. U.T.I.. Inc.. 960 P.2d 904, 906 n.3 (Utah 1998); Monson v. Carver.
928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).
Contrary to Blain's arguments, the trial court carefully reviewed the
factual evidence of this case and concluded Wal-Mart could not have known
of the spill prior to Blain's fall and it had no opportunity to clean the spill
prior to Blain's fall. Memorandum Decision at 1 - 3, Exhibit "C"; R. 175 77. Even when considering the facts in a light most favorable to Blain, the
record reveals no genuine issue of material fact. The trial court ruled
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appropriately in granting Defendant's Motion and Blain's conjecture and
speculation do not justify a reversal of that ruling.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED WAL-MART'S
SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER THE LEGAL STANDARDS
GOVERNING SLIP AND FALL CASES.
In advancing the arguments of liability against Wal-Mart, Blain seems
to ignore the governing legal standards that are required to be met by an
injured party to make out a prima facie case of negligence against a
defendant store owner. The law in Utah provides that "'[t]he owner of a
business is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall.
He is charged with the duty to use reasonable care to maintain the floor of
his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for his patrons.'"
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996)
(quoting Preston v. Lamb. 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968); citing Martin
v. Safewav Stores. Inc.. 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) ("property
owners are not insurers of the safety of those who come upon their property
even though they are business invitees.")).
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The most recent and all-encompassing case addressing slip and fall
law is Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). In
Schnuphase. the Supreme Court of Utah determined that slip-and-fall cases
fall within two general "classes" of cases. The first class of cases
'"involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery
substance on the floor . . . .'" Id. at 478 (quoting Allen. 538 P.2d at
176). The second class of cases "'involves some unsafe condition of a
permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, or of a stairway,
etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was
created or chosen by the defendant. . . .'" Id.
With respect to the first class of cases, the Schnuphase Court
explicitly outlined the minimum level of proof necessary to sustain a prima
facie case:
In this class of cases it is quite universally held that fault
cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had
knowledge of the condition, that is, either actual knowledge, or
constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such
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knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of
reasonable care he should have remedied it.
Id. at 478.
The injured plaintiff has the burden of presenting evidence showing
that the above prerequisites are satisfied in order to make out a prima facie
case of negligence against the defendant. Id- This showing cannot be made
by unsupported assertions or erroneous inferences. Rather, there must be
substantial evidence in the record to support a verdict for plaintiff. Koer v.
Mayfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1967). Utah appellate courts
have upheld a trial courts' granting of summary judgment motions and
motions for directed verdicts on numerous occasions where plaintiff fails to
produce adequate evidence proving notice and a reasonable opportunity to
remedy. Id.; Lindsay. 284 P.2d 477; Mayfair Markets. 431 P.2d 566;
Howard v. Auerbach Co.. 437 P.2d 895 (Utah 1968); Long v. Smith Food
King Store. 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973); Allen. 538 P.2d 175; Martin. 565
P.2dll39.
The case at bar involves a temporary hazard, "a slippery substance on
the floor"; precisely the type of case the Utah Supreme Court determined
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would be governed by the first class of cases. Therefore, the standards
applicable to the first class of cases are controlling here. In other words,
Blain must establish the "notice requirements" to advance her case against
Wal-Mart.
Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that Wal-Mart had notice,
actual or constructive, of the spilled soap before Blain's fall. The trial court
in its Memorandum Decision held that
Ms. Freeman had been cleaning the spill for one to two minutes
when she discovered Plaintiff standing and talking to assistant
manager Guevera after the injury. Plaintiff testified in her
deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen
minutes after the fall. Since Plaintiff was standing when Ms.
Freeman found her talking to Mr. Guevera, Defendant did not
have knowledge of the spill until several minutes after the fall.
Memorandum Decision at 2; R. 176.
As the trial court held, Blain failed to satisfy the two-part test outlined
in Schnuphase. The evidence shows that Ms. Freeman had actual notice of
the liquid detergent spill only after Blain's fall, and Freeman immediately
wiped up the spilled soap after discovering the spill. The arguments raised
by Plaintiff to the contrary are nothing more than bare allegations
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unsupported by facts in the record. Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers. 811
P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991). A review of the actual evidence in the record
shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the trial court
properly granted Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment. Blain's
speculation to the contrary is insufficient to withstand Wal-Mart's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
IV.
BLAIN'S FAILURE TO ATTACH SUPPORTING
EVIDENCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE GROUNDS
MERITING RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 60(b) provides that relief from judgment may be had under
certain circumstances:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may in furtherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trail under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
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released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
UTAHR. CIV.

P. 60(b).

In the case at bar, Blain filed her Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief based
on subsection (b)(1), arguing that her failure to submit the deposition
testimony to the Court for consideration was "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect . . . ." Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Her Motion for Relief from Order at 5 - 7, R. 181 - 183.
However, in advancing her Motion for Relief, Blain made no excuse for her
failure to provide the evidence to support her opposition to summary
judgment. Id. Indeed, she argued repeatedly that the rule does not
require such action. Id.
Blain had the opportunity to offer the information that would support
her opposition to summary judgment. Her only excuse for not providing
the court with the supportive testimony is that, according to her reading of
the law, it was not necessary. Id. She made no indication that the omission
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was due to clerical error or some other reason. The omission, according to
Blain, was that she did not believe attaching the deposition testimony to her
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment was required by the
rules. Id.
Blain's failure to fully research the applicable rules and case law is
not "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect" and neither is her
interpretation of that law. If failure to adequately research legal authority is
an excuse warranting relief from judgment, countless rules and statutes
would be completely undermined. Such is not a valid excuse warranting
reconsideration of a decision.
In denying Blain's Rule 60(b) Motion, the trial Court found that
Blain's failure to provide depositions and other evidence did not constitute
grounds for Rule 60(b) Relief. Ruling dated March 22, 1999 at 1, R. 211.
The Court was well within its discretion in making this Ruling. Larsen v.
Collins. 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984)(holding that trial court's ruling will
only be reversed when there has been an abuse of discretion).
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In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion, Blain cites the
federal case of Blois v. Friday. 612 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Blois that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff relief from summary judgment. In Blois. the
trial court granted summary judgment to defendant because plaintiffs
attorney failed to timely respond to defendant's motion for summary
judgment. The reason plaintiffs attorney did not oppose defendant's
summary judgment motion was because the attorney neglected to notice the
district court of his new address and consequently did not receive
defendant's summary judgment motion until the time to respond had passed.
It is understandable that a court would grant relief for this type of
mistake. The lawyer in Blois had no idea that a summary judgment motion
was pending. A party's not knowing that a motion has been filed is a world
apart from receiving notice of summary judgment, opposing the summary
judgment, and then offering no evidence to support one's contentions.
Blain further claims that the court committed error by raising the
question of attachment sua sponte. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant at 14 and 35
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- 36. Contrary to Blain's assertion that the court voluntarily raised the
issue, Wal-Mart, in its Reply Memorandum to Blain's Memorandum
Opposing Summary Judgment, specifically called the court's attention to the
fact that Blain predicated her misidentification argument "wholly on
speculation" and failed to offer "specific facts". Defendant Wal Mart
Stores' Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13 - 14; R. 154 - 155.
Secondly, because the purpose of summary judgment is to bar from
the court "unjustified" litigation, one of the court's very roles is to sua
sponte raise such an issue. Reliable Furn Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins.
Underwriters. 398 P.2d 685 (Utah 1965). Finally, when the moving party
has presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the
opposing party fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in
concluding that no genuine issue of fact is present or would be at trial.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant and Appellee, Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial court granting WalMart Stores' Motion for Summary Judgment be affirmed, that the Order of
the trial court denying Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Order
be affirmed, and that the appeal of Blain be dismissed.
DATED this / S

day of November, 1999.
MORGAN,

Mitchel T. Rice
Todd C. Hilbig
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the/z day of November, 1999,1 caused two
(2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to be
hand-delivered to the following:
G. Steven Sullivan
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

447 (Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d
1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v.
Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994); Commercial
Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct.

Kule bU

App. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329
Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); PDQ
Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P2d 792 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq.,
115, 116, 122 to 127.
AX.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or
settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.Sd 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case 7 A L R 3d 1000
Quotient'verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.L.R.3d 1101.
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.

Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
c j v il case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
v e r d k t f o r s e c u r i n g n e w t r i a l o r r e v e rsal on
a p p e a i 38 A L R 4th 1170
'^ ' ^
ag bin
Qn ^
sUte
£
4g
?4?
_
, ,
,.,.,.
Court reporters death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
n e w trial
< 5 7 A-UEUth 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
alone n e w trial
granted on ground of inade9 u a c y of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
875.
After-acquired evidence of employee's misconduct as barring or limiting recovery in action for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45
USCS §§ 51etseq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R.
Fed. 189.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at amy time of its own initiative or on the motion of any
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so
corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
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was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affed
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does not limjj
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party fW
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
court The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall K
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action
(Amended effective April 1, 1998 )
Advisory C o m m i t t e e Note. — The 1998
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion
the following "(4) when, for any cause, the
summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action n This basis for a motion is not found
in the federal rule The committee concluded
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-

flict with rules permitting service by •
other than personal ser\ice
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1998 «•
ment deleted the former fourth ground
motion in Subdivision lb) as described!
Advisory Committee Note above, and n
bered the grounds accordingly
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is i
Rule 60 F R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Any other reason justifying relief"
—Default judgment
—Impossibility of compliance with order
— Incompetent counsel
—Lack of due process
—Merits of case
— Mistake or inadvertence
—Mutual mistake
—Real party in interest
— Refund of fine after dismissal
Appeals
Clerical mistakes
— Computation of damages
—Correction after appeal
—Date of judgment
Void judgment
—Estate record
—Inherent power of courts
—Intent of court and parties
—Judicial error distinguished
—Order prepared by counsel
—Predating of new trial motion
Court's discretion
Default judgment
Effect of set-aside judgment
—Admissions
Form of motion
Fraud
—Burden of proof
—Divorce action
Independent action
— Constitutionality of taxes
—Divorce decree
—Fraud or duress
—Motion distinguished
Invalid summons
—Amendment without notice
Inequity of prospective application
Jurisdiction
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect
—Default judgment
Illness
Inconvenience
Meritorious
Merits of claim
Negligence of attorney

No claim for relief
— Delayed motion for new trial
—Factual error
— Failure to file cost bill
— Failure to file notice of appeal
— Nonreceipt of notice and findings
—Trial courts discretion
—Unemployment compensation appeal
—Workmen's compensation appeal
Newly discovered evidence
—Burden of proof
—Discretion not abused
Procedure
—Notice to parties
Res judicata
Reversal of judgment
— Invalidation of sale
Satisfaction, release or discharge
—Accord and satisfaction
—Discharging representative of estate
further demand
—Erroneously included damages
—Prospective application of judgment
Timeliness of motion
—Confused mental condition of party
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution
—Fraud
—Invalid service
—Judicial error
—Jurisdiction
—Mistake inadvertence and neglect
— Newly discovered evidence
—Order entered upon erroneous assumpl
—"Reasonable time "
—Reconsideration of previously denied m<
—Satisfaction
Unauthorized appearance
Void judgment
—Basis
—Lack of jurisdiction
Cited
"Any o t h e r r e a s o n justifying relief.
Subdivision (b)(7) embodies three rec
ments First, that the reason be one other
those listed in Subdivisions (1) througl
second that the reason justify relief, and 1
that the motion be made within a reasoi
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publication was obtained by fraud is a direct
and not a collateral attack Bowen v. Olson, 122
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 < 1952).

164

that issue Downey State Bank v. MajorBlakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).

E x c u s a b l e neglect.
A default certificate may be set aside upon
grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v.
Fabian & Clendenm, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d
189(1962).
While reliance on an attorney's assurances
that one's rights are being protected could, in
the appropriate circumstances, be seen as excusable neglect, trial court properly refused to
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to
establish that she was so represented. Miller v.
Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

— Setting aside proper.
Where plaintiff served defendant with a summons, and left a copy with the defendant which
was not the same as the original, the court had
jurisdiction but sufficient confusion was created so that a motion to set aside the default
judgment should have been granted and the
defendant allowed to plead consistent with our
declared policy that in case of uncertainty,
default judgments should be set aside to allow
trial on the merits. Locke v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d
415, 285P.2d 1111 (1955).
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were properly set aside where trial court failed
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005(1970).
Where appellants, plaintiffs in a civil action,
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date, but due to fact that there were no law or
motion days between time objection was filed
and trial date, objection was never heard, refusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on trial date
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v.
Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977).

— J u d i c i a l attitude.
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor
granting relief from a default judgment, unless
to do so would result in substantial prejudice or
injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975).

Time for appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal
from a default judgment in a city court ran from
the date of notice of entry of such judgment,
rather than from the d a t e of judgment.
Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d
124, 288 P2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank
& Trust Co. v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d).

—Movant's duty.
Party who seeks to have a default judgment
set aside must proffer some defense of at least
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on

Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965);
J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah
1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986).

— Discretion of court.
A trial court is endowed with considerable
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a
motion to set a default judgment aside. Board
of Educ v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806
(1963)
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on three occasions before three different judges and his motions were denied in the first two proceedings,
the third judge was barred by the law of the
case from overruling the previous orders.
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987).
—Grounds.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham-Young L a w Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
265 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
liability against defaulting defendant, 8
A.L.R.3d 1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and

hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.
Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
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support*11? affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney
may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.)
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

DEE BLAIN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 970400626
DATE: February 8, 1999
JUDGE: RAY M.HARDING

vs.

DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

LAW CLERK: DaveBackraan
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and
opposition to the Motion, the Court hereby grants the Motion and delivers the following
Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a liquid detergent spill as she was
approaching the cashier stands at the Wal-mart in Orem. Melia Lei 0'Hawaii White Freeman, a
Wal-mart department manager, testified in her deposition that she had been cleaning the spill for a
minute or two when she turned a corner in an effort to continue to clean the spill trail and found
Plaintiff standing and talking to Troy Guevera, a Wal-mart assistant manager, after the injury.
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen minutes after
the fall.
Opinion of the Court
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law " URCP 56(c). The Court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party Higgins v. Salt Lake County.
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).

In a slip and fall caused by a temporary hazard,
it is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the
defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two conditions
are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge because the condition
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B)
that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the
exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it.
Schnuphase v Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996).
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Defendant had knowledge of the liquid
detergent spill until after Plaintiffs injury. There is also no evidence that the spill had existed for
a long enough time that Defendant had constructive knowledge of it. Ms. Freeman testified in her
deposition that she had been cleaning the spill for one to two minutes when she discovered
Plaintiff standing and talking to assistant manager Guevera after the injury. Plaintiff testified in
her deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen minutes after the fall Since
Plaintiff was standing when Ms. Freeman found her talking to Mr. Guevera, Defendant did not
have knowledge of the spill until several minutes after the fall.
Plaintiff argues that it is disputed whether Defendant had knowledge of the spill before
her fall since she testified in her deposition that she was still lying on the floor when she talked to
Mr. Guevera and because Ms. Freeman's description in her deposition of the person she found
standing and talking to Mr. Guevera was obviously of another woman. However, the Court
cannot consider these arguments since Plaintiff did not provide the Court with a copy of the
portions of the depositions which allegedly contain these statements.
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may
properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact unless
the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the
existence of such an issue. Without such a showing, the Court
need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable law, the
2

moving party is entitled to judgment. Franklin Financial v. New
Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983).
Since Defendant's Motion and supporting portions of depositions do not affirmatively disclose the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court has no supporting factual basis for it to
consider Plaintiffs arguments.
Order
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

DATED this /

day of February, 1999.

HARDING,

cc:

G. Steven Sullivan, Attorney for Plaintiff
Stephen G. Morgan, Attorney for Defendant
Mitchel T. Rice, Attorney for Defendant
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